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Is There a Customer Relationship Effect from Bank ATM Surcharges? 
 
 
This paper investigates the use of ATM surcharges as a strategic device to increase bank 
profitability. We show that ATM surcharge changes can have both a direct effect on bank 
profitability and an indirect effect via customer switching and a related customer relationship 
effect. That is, customer switching results in an increase in the demand for other services 
provided by the surcharge increasing bank. Using unique data bases, we provide evidence to 
show that overall bank profitability is favorably affected by surcharge increases. We also show 
evidence supporting the existence of an indirect effect, especially for larger banks.  
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I. Introduction 
 
 Although the number of U.S. banks continues to decline there has been sustained growth 
in ATM networks and the number of ATMs. According to Dove (2002) virtually every U.S. bank 
is now a member of a shared network (such as Plus, NYCE and Cirrus). Moreover, the number 
of ATMs had grown to over 324,000 as of the end of 2001 (see, Sienkiewicz (2002)). This 
proliferation of ATMs has occurred despite apparent complaints by bankers about the fixed and 
variable costs associated with the new ATMs added to their networks (Dove, 2002). One 
possible reason for the willingness of bankers to keep adding ATMs is that the revenue generated 
from these machines, in the form of direct surcharges to non-bank customers (so-called foreign 
customers) as well as other fees1 outweighs the costs of ATM addition. Indeed, since April 1st 
1996 banks that are members of shared networks have generally been free to set their own 
surcharges for nonbank (foreign) customer use of their ATMs2 (see, Hannan, Kiser, Prager, 
McAndrews (2002)). Thus, one reason underlying ATM proliferation is that foreign (non-bank) 
customer surcharges --so called ATM surcharges-- have made adding ATMs to a bank’s network 
profitable, even in the presence of higher marginal costs. Indeed, revenues from surcharges were 
estimated to exceed $2 billion in 2001 alone (Dove 2002)3. Industry observers and economists 
have labeled this the “direct effect” on bank profits resulting from surcharging (see, for example, 
Dove (2002), Hannan, et al (2002) and Massoud and Bernhardt (2002a and 2002b)). 
 Increasingly, however, bankers and economists are arguing that there is also a second, or 
indirect effect, that emanates from ATM proliferation and surcharging. Indeed, one striking 
result of a recent Dove (2002) survey of banks is that over 50% of large financial institutions 
recognized that there may be an “indirect effect” or customer relationship effect from ATMs that 
                                                 
1 Other fee revenues include a fee charged to a bank’s own customer who uses another bank’s ATMs (a so-called 
foreign fee) as well as interchange fees paid by the customers bank to the ATM owner when the bank’s own 
customer uses the owners ATM. The latter fee is usually set by the network and is constant across all banks in a 
network. Other fees that may be paid or charged include: own-bank ATM fee (which is rare), POS fee, card fee and 
switch fee (see Stavins, 2000 p. 15). 
2 Until April 1st 1996 major shared networks such as Cirrus and Plus prohibited ATM surcharges on other network 
bank customers. This surcharge ban was eliminated on April 1st 1996 and surcharges began to proliferate soon after. 
Moreover, surcharging was prohibited in a number of states prior to 1996 (Prager 2001). 
3 Berger and Mester (1999) have argued that banks become far more focused on revenue generation in the 1990s 
relative to the  1980s. 
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can generate additional profits4 for a bank. In a recent study by bankers, Armstrong, Barron and 
Elgas (2002) a key aspect of their simulations was a modeling of the switching effect. This 
indirect effect has also been recognized in the theoretical papers of Massoud and Bernhardt  
(2002a and 2002b) and McAndrews (2002). 
 While greater ATM proliferation may well attract more customers, due to considerations 
of convenience, the indirect impact of surcharges on total bank profits may be less clear. The 
argument here is that if consumers are forced to pay higher surcharge fees on cash transactions 
they face an incentive to “switch” to the bank charging the higher fees so as to avoid paying 
those fees. This is because only “foreign” customers, who are not account members of that bank, 
will pay an ATM surcharge. If this switching behavior occurs, then these customers will 
presumably purchase a variety of other bank products, which in turn will increase bank revenues 
and profits5.  While a variety of papers in the literature (Massoud and Bernhardt (2002a, 2002b) 
McAndrews (2002) and Hannan et al (2002)) have described or modeled the direct and indirect 
effects, this paper is the first to specifically test for the impact of these effects on bank 
profitability. We are able to do this because we have access to a unique data set containing 
information, among other things, on bank ATM surcharges, ATM network size, ATM 
geographic dispersion, monthly total ATM transactions, the percentage of foreigners using 
ATMs for each of these banks and other key bank ATM variables. Consequently, the major 
contribution of this paper is that it estimates how a strategic variable controlled by bank 
managers, in this case ATM surcharges, impacts various outcomes that are of importance to bank 
profitability, through either the direct or indirect effects described above. Of particular interest is 
how a bank’s ATM surcharge impacts its overall profitability.  In addition, we trace whether 
there is also evidence consistent with the impact of an indirect effect of ATM surcharges on bank 
profitability. This is done by examining a two-step process. In the first step, we examine how 
bank surcharges impact the percentage of ATM users that are not bank customers (so-called 
foreign customers). A finding of a high surcharge being associated with low foreign percent 
usage would be consistent with (high) surcharges inducing foreign customers --especially those 
                                                 
4 According to the Dove (2002) report, 50% of large financial institutions recognized that ATM deployment and 
pricing could be used to attract customers to other bank products. For example, a banker quoted from the Dove 
report p. 110 regarding the advantages underlying extensive ATM networks observed that such networks provided a 
bank with “the ability to leverage 18 million transactions per month into cross-sell opportunities for our products 
and services.” 
5 Mester, Nakaumura and Renault (2003) also show that there is a link between customer checking accounts and the  
information they generate and other services (such as the provision of loans). 
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of small banks with limited networks-- to switch their deposit accounts to larger banks’ charging 
relatively high surcharges so as to avoid such transaction costs. 
The second step is to analyze how surcharges impact the demand for bank services. A finding of 
a link between the ATM surcharge and the demand for bank services would be consistent with an 
indirect affect --one that appears to reflect a customer relationship effect6. To proxy for bank 
services we analyze the sensitivity of depositor growth, total deposits and total loans to ATM 
surcharges. 
Since surcharge fees are a fixed dollar amount per transaction then larger surcharge fees could 
lead to customers withdrawing bigger amounts less frequently from foreign banks instead of 
switching their accounts (i.e. a downward sloping demand curve). We attempt to account for this 
in out tests by employing ATM usage measures (e.g. total transactions per ATM and foreign 
transactions per ATM) as control variables. Moreover, switching is a two part story, as discussed 
in the paragraph above. A finding of high surcharges increasing product demand, in conjunction 
with a finding of a high surcharges reducing the foreign percentage, would be consistent with the 
switching story. 
  Finally, we analyze the relative effects of ATM surcharge liberalization (post-1996) on the 
profitability of small banks versus large banks. For example, while it has been argued that 
branching and merger restrictions have often favored smaller banks (see Economides, Hubbard 
and Palia (1996) and Palia (1994) for example) the expansion of ATMs and ATM price 
liberalization has been viewed as favoring larger banks over smaller banks (see Public Interest 
Research Group (1999))7. This is because, if surcharges are being increased, customers will have 
an incentive to switch from smaller banks to larger banks with bigger networks, although this is 
disputed by the American Bankers Association (1997). 
 Analyzing the effect of the ATM surcharge on bank profitability and its impact on profit, 
via the direct and indirect channels, is different from much of the prior empirical research in this 
area, which has tended to focus on conditions (e.g., bank size, market concentration etc..) under 
which a bank may or may not impose a surcharge and/or whether the surcharge is high or low 
(e.g., Hannan et al, (2002), Stavins (2000)). 
                                                 
6 For detailed discussion of customer relationship effects in a different context see, Onenga and Smith (2001) and 
Bae, Kang and Lim (2002). 
7 A similar public policy concern has been raised about the negative effects of bank merger policy liberalization. 
However, Berger et al. (1998) find no  support for their view in the case of small business lending. 
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Section 2 of this paper briefly provides an overview of ATM growth and pricing. Section 
3 reviews the previous literature on ATM pricing. Section 4 assesses the ex-ante materiality of 
the April 1st 1996 liberalization of ATM surcharges announced by Cirrus and Plus.  Section 5 
presents a model that shows how ATM surcharges impact a bank’s profitability through both a 
direct and indirect channel. Section 6 discusses our hypotheses and empirical methodology. 
Section 7 discusses the empirical results and finally Section 8 is a summary and conclusion. An 
Appendix to the paper describes in detail the ATM data employed in this study provided by 
Dove Consulting group (1999) and (2002)) – henceforth Dove. 
 
2. ATM Proliferation and Pricing 
 The number of ATMs have grown significantly since being introduced in the late 1960s. 
For example, the number of ATMs stood at 324,000 in 2001 versus 83,000 in 1991. There have 
been at least three phases of growth identified (see Dove (2002)). The first phase was pre-1996, 
i.e., pre-independent surcharging, when there was a relatively modest growth in ATMs. The 
second phase was 1996 to approximately 1998 when there was rapid ATM growth following the 
relaxation of restrictions on individual bank surcharges in April 1996. The most recent period 
(i.e., post 1998) has reflected slower growth again.8 
 When a customer uses ATMs’ of banks other than his or her own (a so-called foreign 
customer) he or she is charged at least two separate fees: (i) a surcharge fee by the bank which 
owns the ATM and (ii) a foreign fee by his or her own bank for using ATMs of other banks.9 
 Prior to April 1st 1996, banks’ were generally restricted by ATM shared networks from 
imposing surcharge fees on foreign customers who used ATMs in the shared network other than 
those of their own bank.  On April 1st 1996 Cirrus and Plus announced that they were willing to 
let members of their networks determine their own surcharge fees. Since that time the number of 
banks charging such fees to foreign users has increased rapidly. By 1998 (only two years later) 
78% of US banks were imposing surcharge fees (Stavins (2000)). In the Dove (2002) Survey 
more than 90% of the banks in 2001 imposed ATM surcharges, with larger banks, in general 
                                                 
8 According to Dove (2002) the evolution of ATMs has followed the familiar “S” shape common to many 
innovations. 
9 Stavins (2002) discusses other ATM related fees such as the foreign and interchange fees paid by banks. We do not 
examine foreign fees or others here since bank specific fee charges other than ATM surcharges were not available 
from the Dove data base. 
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imposing higher surcharges than smaller banks (see Dove 2002). Consequently, the surcharge fee 
has been a focal point of much of the prior ATM literature --discussed next in Section 3. 
 
 
3. Previous Literature on ATMs and ATM Pricing 
 Following the dramatic increase in the number of banks applying a surcharge to their 
foreign customers, there has also been an increase in research on this issue. Massoud and 
Bernhardt (2002a and 2002b) and McAndrews (2002) have developed theoretical models which 
introduce and analyze the idea of the indirect effect of ATM surcharging on bank profitability. 
Other research, e.g., by Hannan et al (2002), Prager (1999), Stavins (2000) Prager (2001) have 
examined empirically various elements of ATM pricing. 
 Specifically, in some of these papers (e.g., Hannan et al (2002) and Stavins (2000)) the 
empirical tests aim to identify factors that determine either the size of a bank’s ATM surcharge 
and/or whether a bank sets a surcharge or not10 
 This paper takes a different approach, in that it seeks to examine how a bank’s strategic 
choice of its ATM surcharge affects its profitability. In other words, while much of the literature 
has attempted to explain surcharging levels, our paper examines whether or not surcharges 
impact key outcomes such as bank profitability. In this way we are better able to test the total 
effect, as well as the indirect effects, of surcharging on bank profitability and bank product 
demand. One reason for our ability to examine the indirect effect is that our data (described in 
detail in the Appendix), which is derived from market surveys by Dove ((1999), (2002)) provides 
both time-series and cross sectional information on bank surcharges and ATM usage in total and 
by foreigners. When combined with Call Report data on bank profitability, bank deposits, loans 
and capital adequacy we are able to develop panel-based insights into how bank strategic 
variables impact a bank, and in particular, whether or not an indirect effect is present. By 
                                                 
10 Hannan et al (2002) discuss in some detail the direct effect (“direct revenue generation”) and the indirect effect 
(“strategic motive of attracting customers who wish to avoid paying surcharges”). However, given the nature of their 
data they are unable to directly test these hypotheses. They use a logit regression to examine which factors and 
market characteristics will impact the choice of whether or not to impose a surcharge. They find, for example, that 
the probability of surcharging decreases with ATM share in the market and ATM density while increasing with the 
importance of minorities in the market population and if the state liberalized early on its regulations on surcharging. 
They also find the rate of in-migration to the local banking market has significantly positive effects on surcharges.  
This is consistent with an indirect effect being present i.e., surcharges can induce switching by depositors. Stavins 
(2000) focuses on the size of ATM networks on surcharges and other fees. 
 8
contrast, both the Hannan et al (2002) and Stavins (2000) studies are constrained to analyzing a 
single cross-section of bank surcharges11.  
 Moreover, the empirical questions posed by Hannan et al (2002) --the factors 
determining whether or not a bank imposes a surcharge-- were clearly of importance in the 
context of their 1997 database, when only about half of the banks in their survey imposed ATM 
surcharges. However, the very large increase in the proportion of banks using independent 
surcharges since then leads us to ask a different question in this paper – what has been the impact 
of these surcharges on bank outcomes and, in particular, on bank profitability? 
The empirical research by Prager (2001) examines the issue of whether consumers from 
small banks will switch to larger banks in order to avoid paying a surcharge. This paper does not 
use bank level data but rather examines state level data comparing the market share of small 
banks in states (markets) with and without surcharging over the period 1987 to 1995. She 
concludes that small banks actually did a better job of retaining deposit market share in the 
presence of surcharging than in its absence. Prager uses this evidence to argue against an indirect 
effect. While Prager does attempt to examine how surcharging may impact small bank 
profitability the analysis is conducted in terms of a comparison across markets (states), with and 
without surcharging, rather than at the individual bank level. Finally, Prager’s study covers a 
period prior to the liberalization of ATM surcharging (and the dramatic growth in ATMs) that 
occurred after 1996. By comparison our study uses data from the post-liberalization 1996-2001 
period.  
Finally, since a key component of this paper is the potential profits banks can earn by 
inducing switching, it is related to growing literature on customer relationship effects in banking 
(see for example, Ongena and Smith (2001)). 
 
4. The April 1st 1996 Announcement 
Before tracing the long term impact of the April 1st 1996 liberalization of surcharges on bank 
profitability it is important to establish the materiality of the news of this liberalization on both 
large and small banks. Specifically, what were the market’s (and equity investors) expectation 
regarding the potential impact? To the extent that the market (investors) factored in both direct 
                                                 
11 For example, in Hannan et al (2002), information about surcharges was collected by Moebs Services in 1997 (on 
behalf of the Federal Reserve Board) by telephone survey. Stavins (2000) uses data from a survey of financial 
institutions conducted by Bank Rate Monitor in May 1997. 
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and indirect effects the more likely it is that the announcement had a material effect on bank 
stock returns. 
To examine this question we conducted a standard event study of the impact of the April 1st 1996 
announcement on bank returns and, in particular, the relative impact of this announcement on 
large versus small banks. A review of the Wall Street Journal Index supported the view that the 
April 1st 1996 announcement was a relatively clean (unexpected) announcement and that no 
other major bank-specific news events occurred on that day. 
Abnormal returns were calculated for three portfolios of banks: (i) an all bank portfolio 
containing equally weighted returns on all banks in the Compustat data file who had event day 
returns available from the CRSP data set (370 banks), (ii) a portfolio of big banks (142 banks 
with asset size in April 1996 exceeding $1 billion) and (iii) a portfolio of small banks (228 banks 
with asset size in April 1996 of less than or equal to $1 billion). 
The parameters of the market model were estimated over a one year  (255 day) period ending 46 
days before the event day using the EVENTUS software on WRDS12. To test the significance of 
the announcement day abnormal returns (AR(0)) we used the Patell Z test. 
As can be seen from Table 1, the market expected very different impacts for large versus small 
banks. For large banks the abnormal return on April 1st 1996 was positive 0.64% and significant 
at the 0.01% level, while for small banks the return was negative –0.09% and significant at the 
10% level. For banks overall, the abnormal return was positive 0.19% and significant at the 5% 
level. 
Thus there is evidence to suggest that the market believed that the news of the surcharge 
liberalization would have a material effect on (future) bank profitability and that the principal 
beneficiaries would be large banks. In the rest of the paper we examine whether the market’s 
expectation was correct by employing Dove data and Call report  data over the 1996-2001 
period. 
5. The Theoretical Model 
To establish a framework for empirical analysis and hypotheses testing regarding the 
total, direct and indirect effects of bank ATM surcharges we utilize the theoretical framework of 
Massoud and Bernhardt (2002a and 2002b). 
                                                 
12 This is the standard window length option on Eventus. 
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In Massoud and Bernhardt (2002b) a spatial game is considered between two banks, A 
and B.  Each bank is associated with a distinctive spatial line of length Q and each bank chooses 
the density of its ATM network on a distinctive line where ATM services can be obtained.  
There is a measure n of bank customers. Customers are distinguished by how much they 
value one bank intrinsically. The relative valuation for bank A is uniformly distributed over the 
range [-m,m]. In addition to providing bank deposits and other products, banks provide ATM 
services for members and non-members (so called foreign users). First, customers establish a 
bank account at a local bank. Customers are then hit with a bank-specific location shock that is 
uniformly distributed over the range [0,Q].  Each customer receives incremental utility M from 
consuming bank services. The transportation cost of acquiring a service is Td where d is the 
distance traveled to the closest ATM and T is an incremental transportation cost. Each Bank 
chooses its own ATM network size, jα ,  bank product charges, 
jF  and an ATM service fee to 
members and non-members,   ),(δjP  where 1=δ    for members and 0=δ  for non-members13. 
Here bank product charges (Fj) are broadly defined to include returns from investing in assets 
(e.g. making loans) backed by relatively low cost deposits. Stavins (2002) among others argues 
that the fee banks charge their own customers for using their own ATM machines is invariably 
zero, so that ATM fees, here, are isomorphic to bank’s ATM surcharges on foreign users. 
5.1. Timing of the game: 
Stage 1, banks maximize profits by choosing the density of their ATM locations and the prices 
charged for different services (e.g. ATM surcharge to foreign users). 
Stage 2, each customer chooses a bank at which to establish an account.  
Stage 3, each customer receives a bank-specific location shock and chooses where to obtain 
his/her ATM service. 
The expected profit function of Bank A is  
,))0()(0( ααπ CCpyNFN AATM
AA
B
A
AA −−+=
14                (1)  
Where jN  is the number of bank j’s customers, ATMC  is the marginal cost of providing ATM 
services to non-members, αC  is the cost of installing each ATM machine, )0(
Ay  is the 
proportion of foreigners as customers, (i.e. bank B customers in this game using bank A’s ATMs) 
                                                 
13 Here members are the depositors who hold deposit accounts at the bank. 
14 For simplicity, we consider a reduced form of the profit function where the in-branch service fee and the ATM 
service fees for members are set equal to their marginal cost.  
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and )0(Ap  is the ATM surcharge fee bank A charges bank B customers. The first term in 
equation (1) is the bank’s profit from members use of bank products such as deposits and loans, 
the second term is the profit from non-members (i.e. foreigners) who use bank A’s ATM services 
and the last term is the cost of installing the ATM network. 
When a bank chooses its optimal ATM surcharge it takes into consideration how that 
surcharge would directly impact its profitability --which depends on foreign customers demand 
elasticity, as well as the indirect effects on its profitability as a result of switching. That is, the 
effect of ATM pricing on a bank’s profitability can be decomposed into two effects: a direct 
effect and an indirect effect. 
 
5.2. Bank Surcharge: The Direct and Indirect Effects 
The effects of a marginal change in the ATM surcharges on a bank’s profitability is 
shown by the following first order condition:  






+−
∂
∂
+−
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
=
∂
∂ )0())0((
)0(
)0())0()(0(
)0()0()0(
A
ATM
A
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A
BATM
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A
A
A
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       (2) 
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The first two terms in equation (2) show the indirect effect of ATM surcharges on bank A’s 
profitability, where A
A
A F
p
N
)0(∂
∂  is the increase in bank-account membership and bank service 
purchases induced by a marginally higher surcharge times the bank product charges or profit 
extracted from other bank product provision, and ))0()(0(
)0( ATM
AA
A
B Cpy
p
N
−
∂
∂  is the loss in 
surcharge revenues from those foreign customers (i.e. bank B customers in this model) who 
switch bank-membership to bank A, due to the increase in ATM surcharges15.  
The last term in equation (2), 






+−
∂
∂ )0())0((
)0(
)0( A
ATM
A
A
A
B yCpp
yN , shows the direct effect of 
ATM surcharges on bank A’s profitability which is the impact of increasing ATM surcharges on 
surcharge profits from (foreign) customers who continue to establish bank accounts at competing 
                                                 
15 The bank does not charge a surcharge to its own members (depositors). 
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bank B. The third and last term in equation (2), or the direct effect, can be rewritten in terms of 
non-members ATM demand elasticity, ξ : 






+
−
− 1
)0(
))0(()0( A
ATM
A
B
A
p
CpNy ξ . The sign of this term 
depends on  






+
−
− 1
)0(
))0((
A
ATM
A
p
Cpsign ξ . If this term is non-negative,  01
)0(
))0(( ≥





+
−
− A
ATM
A
p
Cpξ ,  then it 
implies that    
ATM
A
A
Cp
p
−
≤
)0(
)0(ξ  and 1
)0(
)0(
>
− ATM
A
A
Cp
p .  Given that in general a monopoly operates in a 
price region such that the elasticity exceeds one16, then this   inequality 
ATM
A
A
Cp
p
−
≤<
)0(
)0(1 ξ  should 
hold which implies that ATM profits are positively related to ATM surcharges.    
Note also that,   0
)0(
>
∂
∂
A
A
p
N , shows that an increase in the  ATM surcharge increases a 
bank’s customer base because of switching, that  0
)0(
<
∂
∂
A
B
p
N shows that an increase in the ATM 
surcharge reduces a rival bank’s customer base and  0
)0(
)0( <
∂
∂
A
A
p
y  shows that an increase in the 
ATM surcharge reduces a bank’s market share of non-member (foreign) customers.  
Finally, in a related spatial model Massoud an Bernhardt (2002a) show that larger banks (with 
larger ATM networks) set higher ATM surcharges and generate more profits from customers 
than smaller banks through the sale of additional bank services. 
 
6. Hypotheses 
 From the theoretical model in Section 5 in which a bank employs its surcharge level as a 
strategic variable to increase profitability either through a direct or indirect channel we can 
derive a number of testable hypotheses. Specifically, we test the following four hypotheses with 
respect to ATM surcharges and bank profitability: 
6.1 Total Effect 
Hypothesis 1:  
If foreign users are relatively price inelastic (direct effect) and/or switching is sufficiently strong 
to overcome any loss in revenue if foreign users are price elastic (indirect effect), then overall 
bank profitability (ROA and ROE) will be increasing in ATM surcharge levels: 
                                                 
16 Tirole (1988), page 66, shows that when the elasticity of demand is less than one, the monopolist’s revenue -- and 
his profits -- are decreasing in quantity.  
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H1: ) variablescontrol ,)0((
)(+
=
j
j pfROE  
       ) variablescontrol,)0((
)(+
=
j
j pgROA  
 
6.2 Indirect Effect 
Hypothesis 2:  
While a finding that overall profits are positively linked to surcharges is consistent with the 
presence of both direct and indirect effects we wish to investigate the indirect channel more 
deeply.  In particular, a two-step process is required for the indirect channel.  Consequently, we 
propose to test H2 and H3:            
H2:           ) variablescontrol ,)0(()0(
)(−
=
jj phy  
 H2 is a hypothesis that involves the first step in the indirect channel, namely; higher 
surcharges ( )0(jp ) can result in a lower proportion of foreign ATM users ( )0(jy ) since foreign 
users have an incentive to switch to becoming bank customers (depositors) to avoid ATM 
surcharges.  Thus, the relationship between foreign usage proportion and bank surcharge levels is 
expected to be negative. As discussed above, when we estimate this hypothesis, we control for 
possible changes in usage by foreign depositors.    
Hypothesis 3: 
  
            H3:   ) variablescontrol,)0(( 
)(+
=
j
j pkgrowthDepositor  
) variablescontrol,)0((
)(+
=
j
j phDeposits  
) variablescontrol,)0((
)(+
=
j
j piLoans  
 
 H3 reflects the second step in the indirect channel, namely; that ATM users who switch 
to become bank account holders consume more bank products and thus generate additional 
revenue for the bank.  Here, we proxy for increased consumption of bank products by the change 
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in the number of depositors between t and t+1, and the dollar size of a bank’s deposits and loans. 
Such consumption would potentially add to a bank’s overall profitability.  
6.3. Large versus Small Banks 
H4: The impact of surcharges in H1 to H3 above, with regard to overall bank profitability and 
the indirect channel, is stronger for large banks than small banks. Such a finding would be 
consistent with the view of many public policy advocates and legislators17 that freeing 
surcharges has resulted in strategic use of ATM prices to the benefit of large banks over small 
banks. This is because consumers have an incentive to switch from smaller to larger banks with 
more extensive ATM networks in order to avoid paying surcharges. 
 
7. Empirical Methodology and Results 
 An Appendix to this paper provides a detailed description of data used in this study. As 
discussed there the empirical tests of the overall and the indirect effect of ATM surcharges on 
bank profitability over the period 1996-2001 are based on underlying survey data generated by 
Dove Consulting of Boston in two reports on ATM deployment and pricing– the first in 1999 
and the second in 2002. These data provide specific details by bank and year regarding ATM 
surcharge, ATM network size, transactions per ATM, percent use of a bank’s ATM network by 
foreigners as well as other pertinent ATM related data. As discussed in the Appendix not every 
variable was available each year and the sample of banks differed over the 1999 and 2002 
surveys. Nevertheless, these data are sufficiently rich to allow us to examine the impact of ATM 
surcharges on bank profitability as well as to gain an understanding of the indirect channel 
through which ATM pricing affects bank profitability. 
 To gain insights into the overall and indirect channels resulting from ATM surcharges we 
employ bank Call Report data and Federal Reserve generated bank market share data in addition 
to Dove data.18  The Call Reports used were those that most closely matched the dates of the 
Dove surveys. The variables derived from Call Reports were growth in number of depositors for 
accounts less than $100,000, dollar value of loans and dollar value of deposits as dependent 
variables in the indirect channel tests. And, as independent or control variables, we derived a 
measure of bank risk (the bank capital-asset ratio) and size (bank assets).   
                                                 
17 As well as the model of Massoud and Bernhardt (2002a). 
18 The market share variable used in these tests was the percent of the bank’s deposits relative to total deposits in the 
State in which the bank’s headquarters is located. 
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 As additional control variables we included the number of transactions per ATM and the 
size of the bank’s ATM network (number of ATMs).  We also included a measure of geographic 
dispersion of a bank’s ATM network. Dove consulting divides the U.S. into 7 regions and 
identifies whether a bank has ATMs in each region and outside the U.S. (internationally) --
making 8 possible regions in all.  The geographic dispersion variable takes a value between one 
and eight, where the value of this variable reflects the sum of the regions over which a bank 
locates its ATMs.  The Appendix discusses in more detail the different regions identified in the 
Dove surveys. 
 In testing hypotheses H1 to H4 we employ both fixed and random effect tests of the 
impact of ATM surcharges on the various dependent variables of interest (bank profits, demand 
for other bank products and switching).  To determine the best fitting model we employ the 
Hausman test statistic. The null hypothesis under the Hausman test statistic is whether the 
random effects model is appropriate.  In such cases we report the fixed effects model. We report 
only the most appropriate model (random effects or fixed effects) according to the Hausman test. 
For each panel model test we report the R2 within, which measures the proportion of the variance 
explained by variation within groups (here banks over time),  R2 between, which measures the 
proportion of the variance explained by variation between groups (banks), and the total R2. for 
the panel.  
For all four hypothesis we estimated both contemporaneous results (i.e. where the dependent 
variable is measured in the same year as the independent or control variables)  and results when 
the dependent variable is one year ahead of the independent variables --which are labeled 
“Lead”. There are two reasons why we believe that the lead results offer a better test of the link 
between ATM surcharges and bank profitability. First, the lead results capture causality in the 
relationship by focusing on how a change in ATM surcharge in one year impacts the dependent 
variables (e.g. profitability) one year later. Second, the lead equations also capture any likely 
depositor or customer frictions, in that it may take a period of time for customers to process the 
fact that a bank has changed its ATM surcharge. Thus, in general, we report the lead variable 
results in the Tables.19  Nevertheless, the results relating to the significance of the ATM 
                                                 
19 Where not reported the results of tests using contemporaneous values of the dependent variables are available 
from the authors on request.   
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surcharge variable are generally similar in both the lead and the contemporaneous regressions.   
Tables 2 to 8 report the empirical tests of hypotheses H1 to H4 discussed above. 
 
7.1. Results of the Effects on Total Profitability (H1) and Large versus Small Bank (H4) 
 Tables 2 and 3 show, respectively, the effects of surcharge change in one year on bank 
ROA and ROE in the next year. As can be seen a striking result in both tables is the positive and 
statistically significant impact of bank surcharge on bank profitability. Specifically, Table 2 
suggests that a $1 dollar increase in a bank’s surcharge (e.g. from 50 cents to $1.50) increases 
bank ROA by 0.17%, while from Table 3 an increase in surcharge by $1 leads to an increase in 
bank ROE by 2%.  As noted earlier, this positive total effect may be due to either a direct effect 
and/or an indirect effect --reflecting customer switching.  With respect to big versus small banks 
(i.e. those banks with over $1billion in assets versus those with assets $1billion or less) there is a 
clear size effect.  Specifically, for both ROA and ROE the surcharge variable has a strongly 
positive and statistically significant impact on large banks ROA and ROE while for small banks 
the impact is insignificantly different from zero for both profitability measures. This suggests 
that the equity markets ex-ante expectation of a relatively favorable effect on large bank 
profitability resulting from surcharge liberalization was confirmed over the 1996-2001 period. 
 
7.2. Results for the Indirect Channel for all Banks (H2 and H3) and for Large versus Small 
Banks (H4) 
 Tables 4 and 5 show the sensitivity of foreign (non-bank) ATM users to a bank’s ATM 
surcharge. As can be seen in both Tables 4 and 5, for all banks the surcharge variable is 
significantly negative at the 10% level or better. That is, a higher surcharge results in a lower 
foreign percentage usage, which is consistent with customer switching and supports H2 (it is also 
the first step in the indirect channel). Moreover, since switching can be quite fast, occurring 
contemporaneously in the year of the surcharge change or be delayed due to transactional 
frictions  (i.e. switching occurs in the following (or lead) year), it is of interest that both the lead 
tests (Table 4) and the contemporaneous tests (Table 5) support a significant impact of ATM 
surcharges on customers switching behavior  (i.e. high surcharges induce customers to switch to 
the high ATM surcharge bank).  However, it appears that the surcharge variable is more 
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significant in the contemporaneous tests than the lead tests –suggesting that switching takes 
place quite fast. 
With respect to H4, and large versus small bank customer switching, the surcharge variable is 
significantly negative at the 1% level for large banks in the contemporaneous regression but is 
negative and insignificantly different from zero for small banks. Thus, the data support a more 
powerful switching effect for large banks consistent with H4. 
As described above, a finding of an increase in surcharge lowering the foreign percentage can be 
the result of either customers switching or foreigners using other bank’s ATMs less as the 
surcharge increases. We attempt to control for the second possibility by controlling for ATM 
usage. In Tables 5 and 5a we have two different measures of ATM usage respectively, total 
ATM transactions per ATM, as well as foreign ATM transactions per ATM (defined as total 
ATM transactions times the foreign percentage).  
As can be seen in both Tables 5 and 5a, the surcharge variable is highly significant and negative 
for large banks, but insignificant for small banks. Furthermore, as discussed in the introduction, 
switching is a two-part story. A finding that a surcharge increase will reduce the foreign 
percentage, coupled with a finding that a surcharge increase will increase the demand for other 
bank products (e.g. loans and deposits) will be consistent with the switching story.       
 Tables 6, 7, and 8 seek to test the second step in the indirect channel (hypothesis H3), i.e., 
once a customer has switched do we see an expansion in customer demand for bank products?  
Table 6, analyses the growth in the number of bank depositors (with under $100,000) 
between time t and t+1, i.e.,  on a year-by-year basis. As can be seen the sign of the coefficient 
of ATM surcharges on depositor growth is significantly positive for all banks, i.e.  a high bank 
ATM surcharge is associated with a higher depositor growth rate in the succeeding year.  Thus 
for all banks the second link in the indirect channel implied by H3 has support. When the data is 
split into large versus small banks it can be seen that the surcharge variable is significantly 
positive for large banks at the 5% level but is insignificantly different from zero for small banks. 
Again to the extent that the indirect channel works, it appears to work mostly through large 
banks, a result consistent with H4.  
 
 Tables 7 and 8 analyze the effects of bank surcharge on the quantity (measured in dollars) 
of specific bank products.  For the dollar value of loans and deposits, where one year lead values 
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of these variables are used as dependent variables, the bank ATM surcharge variable is positive 
and statistically significant20. 
This adds further support to H3 and the presence of an indirect effect of ATM surcharges on 
bank profitability. Tables 7 and 8 also show a more significant effect of ATM surcharge on large 
bank deposits and loans in the succeeding year than for small banks. A result supportive of the 
indirect channel being relatively stronger for large banks consistent with H4. 
 
 
7.3. Robustness Checks 
A number of robustness checks were also conducted with respect to the results in Tables 2 to 8. 
We estimated the model using various interaction variables. Most notably, ATM network size 
was interacted with surcharge as well as bank asset size with surcharge. These (interactive) 
variables did not change the explanatory power of the surcharge variable in the presence of  bank 
asset size and the large versus small bank sample split. We also estimated various alternative 
instruments for the bank surcharge variable by regressing it (using panel techniques) on various 
size related and other variables; specifically, asset size, ATM network size and geographic 
dispersion. Using these instruments in the tests, instead of surcharge, did not significantly change 
the results. Indeed, in many cases the statistical significance of the surcharge instrumental 
variable was higher.  Overall, the impact of surcharge on bank profitability, switching and bank 
products appeared to be robust to alternative specifications.  
  
8.  Summary and Conclusion 
 This paper has modeled and tested the relationship between a bank’s foreign-user ATM 
surcharge and its overall profitability.  An important aspect of this paper was to identify and test 
for an indirect (or customer relationship) channel linking surcharge levels to bank profitability. 
Using unique data sets provided by Dove Consulting which contained both time-series as well as 
cross-sectional information on bank ATM surcharges and other ATM related variables, it was 
found that there is evidence consistent with customer switching and thus the indirect channel. 
Specifically, higher ATM surcharge levels were associated with greater depositor growth, greater 
deposit amounts and greater loan amounts. In addition, foreign ATM users seemed to be averse 
                                                 
20 The surcharge variable is also significant in both contemporaneous tests for deposits and loans. 
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to high surcharge levels, such that high surcharge levels may have induced foreign users to 
switch to becoming account holders of the high foreign surcharge bank.  Finally, consistent with 
the equity markets ex-ante expectations, with respect to ATM surcharge liberalization, larger 
banks appear to have benefited far more than smaller banks. This suggests that public policy 
concerns regarding the negative effect of liberalizing ATM surcharges on smaller banks have 
some merit. 
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Appendix 
 
Data  
An important aspect of this paper lies in the uniqueness of the ATM data set employed in 
our tests. This data set was purchased from Dove Consulting Inc., Boston,  and includes bank 
level data on a range of variables that have not previously been used in the empirical ATM 
literature. In particular, the data includes a measure of the percentage of ATM users for different 
banks who are foreigners – i.e., those who pay ATM surcharges. This variable, in conjunction 
with other data such as surcharge amount and ATM network size, allows us to test the 
hypotheses discussed in the paper. The Dove Survey data is used in conjunction with a variety of 
other publically available sources of bank level data, including Call Reports (Report of Condition 
and Income) taken from the Federal Reserve’s web site as was Market Share data. 
 The data base provided by Dove Consulting is taken from two separate surveys of ATM 
providers --one taken in 1998 and the second in 2001(The Dove Reports themselves were 
published in 1999 and 2002 respectively). In each case data were collected from each bank in the 
sample for the preceding three years generating a 6-year sample that spans 1996-2001. The two 
surveys are not identical across the two time periods, thus some data are available for some of 
the time periods only. For example, while each of the two Dove surveys asked respondents for 
information on a variety of variables for each of the preceding three years, this was not the case 
for the foreign percentage variable. The first survey conducted during 1998 did ask for this data 
for each of the preceding 3 years, however, the second survey only asked the respondents for this 
data for the final year of that survey i.e., 2001. In other words, in some of our empirical tests, e.g. 
those which require the use of the foreign percentage variable, we use a data set made up of a 
given set of banks for each of 1996, 1997 and 1998 and different banks in 2001. 
 A further issue with our data concerns how the banks were asked to report their ATM 
surcharges over the preceding three years. In the case of both the 1998 and 2001 surveys, banks 
were asked to provide data on their ATM surcharges at the time of the survey. They were also 
asked to provide the date of the last change of the surcharge and how much that change was (in 
dollars and cents). This information is enough to create a partial historical record of surcharges 
charged by each bank. For example, if the date of the previous surcharge change occurred prior 
to the three-year period covered by the survey, then we are able to use the value of the surcharge 
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in the final year of the survey for all of the previous three years.  Similarly, if the most recent 
surcharge change occurred during the preceding three years we are able to infer surcharges after 
that date. However, we would not be able to infer surcharges outside the three-year window of 
each data set. In cases where we are not able to infer the surcharge amount from the data, we do 
not use the data. 
Another variable employed is the measure of geographic dispersion of a bank’s ATM 
network.  Dove divides the U.S. into 7 regions and identifies whether each bank (in each year) 
has an ATM in one of those regions plus whether ATMs are held internationally (making 8 
regions). The 7 U.S. regions identified were New England, Mid-Atlantic, Southeast, South, 
Midwest, Mountain and Pacific (see Dove, 1999, p. 27). The geographic dispersion variable 
takes a value between one and eight, where the value of the variable reflects the sum of the 
regions where a bank locates its ATMs. For example, if geographic dispersion is equal to one, it 
indicates an ATM presence in only one region and if it is higher than one it indicates presence in 
more than one region. 
In Table A1 below we provide a summary table of the data used in the paper:  
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Table A 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable 
 
Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Return on 
Equity 
360 8.31 5.21 -9.69 34.63 
Return on 
Assets 
360 0.68 0.49 -4.06 3.07 
Change in 
number of 
Depositors 
355 524.43 8569.85 -100.00 161178.50 
Total Loans 
($M) 
360 12300 42400 1.751 391000 
Total 
Deposits 
($M) 
360 10100 32000 1.244 317000 
Foreign 
Percentage 
204 37.75 16.33 5.00 100.00 
Surcharge 329 1.22 0.49 0.00 2.00 
Number of 
ATMs 
358 564.59 1579.94 0.00 14249.00 
Transactions 
per ATM 
(pm) 
315 4322.02 6410.67 4.47 59235.90 
Foreign 
Transactions 
per ATM 
(pm) 
201 1325.62 1005.68 1.72 10592.42 
Capital Ratio 360 9.35 5.23 0.98 54.46 
Assets ($M) 360 19900 68100 9.45 607000 
Market Share 357 6.09 12.76 0.00 189.00 
Geographic 
Dispersion 
363 1.69 1.40 1.00 8.00 
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Table 1: 
Abnormal Return on Event Day (Day Zero) of Cirrus/Plus 
Announcement Freeing Restraints on ATM Surcharges (April 1, 
1996) 
 
 
 All Banks Big Banks 
(Assets> $1B) 
Small Banks 
(Assets< $1B) 
Abnormal 
Return 
(Day Zero) 
0.19% 0.64% -0.09 
Patell Z Test 2.233** 5.442**** -1.407* 
Number of 
Banks 
370 142 228 
*       indicates significance at 10% 
**     indicates significance at 5% 
***   indicates significance at 1% 
**** indicates significance at 0.01% 
 
Data taken from all banks in Compustat Bank File who have event day 
returns data available from CRSP Dataset. Asset size determined from 
Compustat as at 1996. Return on Market Model with Equally 
Weighted Index. Market Model estimated over 255 days in length, 
ending 46 days before event day. Estimation conducted using 
EVENTUS software. 
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Table 2:  
The Relationship Between ATM Surcharge and ROA (Lead), 1996-2001 
 All Banks Std Error Big Banks 
(Assets> 
$1B) 
Std Error Small Banks 
(Assets< 
$1B) 
Std Error 
Surcharge 
 
 
 0.1737*** 0.0454716 0.274088*** 0.05812 -0.01485 0.067487 
Number of 
ATMs  
 
 7.62E-06 0.0000372 -1.2E-05 3.72E-05 -0.0006 0.000515 
Geographic 
Dispersion 
 
 0.037714 0.0287631 0.043258 0.031221 0.015392 0.059842 
Transactions 
per ATM 
 
 5.87E-06 4.34E-06 1.04E-05** 5.13E-06 -4.09E-06 6.51E-06 
Bank 
CapitalRatio 
 
 0.006841 0.0056544 0.033344*** 0.011111 0.001575 0.005578 
Bank Assets 
 
 3.20E-13 6.78E-13 3.11E-13 6.69E-13 4.27E-11 1.43E-10 
Market 
Share 
 
-0.00017 0.0010936 -0.00051 0.001083 0.175082 0.071747 
Constant  0.3358*** 0.0973816 -0.00151 0.134578 0.541832*** 0.152274 
Sample Size 276  182  94  
2R  Within 0.09  0.16  0.02  
2R  Between 0.12  0.29  0.19  
2R  Overall 0.09  0.19  0.16  
Hausman 
Test 2χ  
9.54(0.21) 
Random 
effects is 
appropriate 
estimator 
 13.5 (0.06) 
Random 
effects is 
appropriate 
estimator 
 1.69 (0.94) 
Random 
effects is 
appropriate 
estimator 
 
***   Indicates p value of 1%   
**     Indicates p value of 5% 
*       Indicates p value of 10% 
(.)     Indicates  p value 
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Table 3:  
The Relationship Between ATM Surcharge and ROE (Lead), 1996-2001 
 All Banks Std Error Big Banks 
(Assets> 
$1B) 
Std Error Sml Banks 
(Assets< 
$1B) 
Std Error 
Surcharge 
 
 2.06423*** 0.6466082 2.9994*** 0.910303 0.443974 0.733256
Number of 
ATMs 
  
-0.0002266 0.0004920 -0.00022 0.00055 -0.00463 0.005913
Geographic 
Dispersion 
 
 0.1826976 0.3781347 0.134643 0.457946 -0.05633* 0.680839
Transactions 
per ATM 
 
 0.0000671 0.0000555 0.000113 7.25E-05 -4.8E-05 7.48E-05
Bank 
CapitalRatio 
 
-0.26407*** 0.0728048 -0.512*** 0.170418 -0.12888 0.065657
Bank Assets 
 
 8.32e-12 9.31E-12 6.16E-12 1.03E-11 5.42E-10 1.66E-09
Market 
Share 
 
 0.0321767* 0.0169702 0.029857 0.018978 2.635193 0.846413
Constant 
 
7.5169910*** 1.3155360 8.668368 2.050562 6.671345 1.729184
Sample Size 
 
276  182  94  
2R  Within 
 
0.07  0.12  0.01  
2R  Between 
 
0.18  0.15  0.36  
2R  Overall 
 
0.17  0.15  0.35  
Hausman 
Test 2χ  
9.57 (0.2141) 
Random 
effects is 
appropriate 
estimator 
 6.15 (0.52) 
Random 
effects is 
appropriate 
estimator 
 3.58(0.73) 
Random 
effects is 
appropriate 
estimator 
 
***   Indicates p value of 1%   
**     Indicates p value of 5% 
*       Indicates p value of 10% 
(.)     Indicates  p value 
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Table 4:  
The Relationship Between ATM Surcharge and Foreign Percentage (Lead), 1996-2001 
 All Banks Std Error Big Banks 
(Assets> 
$1B) 
Std Error Small Banks 
(Assets< 
$1B) 
Std Error 
Surcharge 
 
  -8.365*   5.04634 -3.36762 3.188478 -35.9697 20.33343 
Number of 
ATMs 
  
  -0.01088  0.0112 -0.00251 0.003071 -0.57991 0.537001 
Geographic 
Dispersion 
 
  -0.45271    5.5607 0.807938 1.790671 N/A N/A 
Transactions 
per ATM 
 
  -0.00092    0.0013 -0.00018 0.000232 -0.04088** 0.010593 
Bank 
CapitalRatio 
 
225.3731** 111.3641 -0.43981 1.117792 3.832835 3.397254 
Bank Assets 
 
   1.33E-10     1.E-10 2.88E-11 9.51E-11 -2.74E-07 2.91E-07 
Market 
Share 
 
   1.635177     1.0391 -0.19803 0.186232 63.81943 76.98086 
Constant 
 
 22.43404   16.6152 42.82169 11.77845 228.4608* 120.8998 
Sample Size 
 
118  76  42  
2R  Within 
 
0.41  0.04  0.74  
2R  Between 
 
0.01  0.17  0.13  
2R  Overall 
 
0.02  0.09  0.10  
Hausman 
Test 2χ  
14.46(0.04) 
Random 
effects is 
inappropriate 
estimator 
 12.57(0.08)
Random 
effects is 
appropriate 
estimator 
 20.80(0.00) 
Random 
effects is 
inappropriate 
estimator 
 
***   Indicates p value of 1%   
**     Indicates p value of 5% 
*       Indicates p value of 10% 
(.)     Indicates  p value 
N/A. Because small banks were not geographically dispersed enough and there was insufficient 
variability across banks this variable was dropped in the small bank tests in this sample. 
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Table 5:  
The Relationship Between ATM Surcharge and Foreign Percentage (current), 1996-
2001 
 All Banks Std Error Big Banks 
(Assets> 
$1B) 
Std Error Small 
Banks 
(Assets< 
$1B) 
Std Error 
Surcharge 
 
-6.28685*** 2.133036 -15.21*** 3.534165 -3.5679 4.18162 
Number of 
ATMs 
  
-0.00096 0.00179 0.000186 0.004107 -0.0082 0.032537 
Geographic 
Dispersion 
 
-0.07767 1.328582 -10.6369*** 3.131837 1.641058 3.749934 
Transactions 
per ATM 
 
-0.00059*** 0.00024 0.000794 0.000749 -0.00124 0.001185 
Bank 
CapitalRatio 
 
 0.06763 0.256811 -3.60596** 1.649817 0.085686 0.377879 
Bank Assets 
 
-4.40E-12 3.13E-11 8.92E-11 6.91E-11 -1.55E-08 1.02E-08 
Market 
Share 
 
-0.17791 0.169284 0.157002 0.496199 -0.32102 1.005671 
Constant 
 
47.73202*** 4.691936 97.13029 16.8455 51.9169*** 10.32471
Sample Size 
 
182  113  69  
2R  Within 
 
0.11  0.51  0.00  
2R  Between 
 
0.15  0.00  0.15  
2R  Overall 
 
0.13  0.01  0.21  
Hausman 
Test 2χ  
5.98(0.54)  
Random 
effects is 
appropriate 
estimator 
 23.53(0.00) 
Random 
effects is 
inappropriate 
estimator 
 1.89(0.92) 
Random 
effects is 
appropriate 
estimator 
 
***   Indicates p value of 1%   
**     Indicates p value of 5% 
*       Indicates p value of 10% 
(.)     Indicates  p value 
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Table 5a:  
The Relationship Between ATM Surcharge and Foreign Percentage (current), 1996-2001 (Foreign 
Transactions per ATM as a control variable). 
 All Banks Std Error Big Banks 
(Assets> $1B) 
Std Error Small Banks 
 
Std Error 
Surcharge 
 
-3.98876 2.646505 -12.258*** 3.216126 2.354868 3.861406 
Number of 
ATMs 
  
-0.00154 0.004583 8.99E-05 0.00359 -0.01765 0.027916 
Geographic 
Dispersion 
 
-10.3522*** 3.513204 -11.7281*** 2.726781 -0.07047 3.25748 
Foreign 
Transactions 
per ATM 
 
0.007296*** 0.00149 0.00584*** 0.001544 0.010251*** 0.002328 
Bank 
CapitalRatio 
 
-0.32749 1.01139 -2.83612* 1.466711 -0.04213 0.325147 
Bank Assets 
 
9.56E-11 7.64E-11 9.71E-11 6.07E-11 -1.88E-08** 8.63E-09 
Market 
Share 
 
0.00792*** 0.426391 0.195973 0.427643 0.112759* 0.894473 
Constant 
 
51.81854*** 11.97603 83.89472*** 15.25854 34.66554*** 9.203405 
Sample Size 
 
182 
 
 113  69 
 
 
2R  Within 
 
0.36  0.61  0.21  
2R  Between 
 
0.00  0.01  0.39  
2R  Overall 
 
0.03  0.03  0.44  
Hausman 
Test 2χ  
17.26(0.01) 
Random 
effects is 
inappropriate 
estimator 
 
 41.75 (0.00) 
Random effects 
is inappropriate 
estimator 
 7.60(0.26) 
Random 
effects is 
appropriate 
estimator 
 
***   Indicates p value of 1%   
**     Indicates p value of 5% 
*       Indicates p value of 10% 
(.)     Indicates  p value 
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Table 6:  
The Relationship Between ATM Surcharge and Change in the Number of Bank 
Depositors, 1996-2001 
 All Banks Std Error Big Banks 
(Assets> 
$1B) 
Std Error Small Banks 
(Assets< 
$1B) 
Std Error 
Surcharge 
 
  50.3209* 26.13786 82.13017** 41.48083 15.37865 22.33711 
Number of 
ATMs  
 
    0.0990**   0.0385 0.089001** 0.044687 0.433808 0.706343 
Geographic 
Dispersion 
 
111.5937*** 33.10758 113.4618*** 39.04001 -43.6143 96.26599 
Transactions 
per ATM 
 
  -0.00114   0.006 -0.00801 0.010581 0.00229 0.0044 
Bank 
CapitalRatio 
 
  -4.04919   8.0505 -8.36758 11.3235 1.642042 6.640426 
Bank Assets 
 
  -3.E-09***   6.5E-10 -2.9E-09*** 7.55E-10 -1.90E-07 1.65E-07 
Market 
Share 
 
  -1.333**   0.5284 -1.22431** 0.609154 -13.0338 8.494056 
Constant 
 
-166.273* 96.73478 -186.337 130.0116 163.6215 171.4575 
Sample Size 
 
268  175  93  
2R  Within 
 
0.21  0.25  0.08  
2R  Between 
 
0.00  0.00  0.03  
2R  Overall 
 
0.00  0.02  0.01  
Hausman 
Test 2χ  
 7.65(0.014) 
Random 
effects is 
inappropriate 
estimator 
 25.55(0.00) 
Random 
effects is 
inappropriate 
estimator 
 1.15(0.97) 
Random 
effects is 
appropriate 
estimator 
 
***   Indicates p value of 1%   
**     Indicates p value of 5% 
*       Indicates p value of 10% 
(.)     Indicates  p value 
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Table 7:  
The Relationship Between ATM Surcharge and Dollar Value of Bank Loans (Lead), 1996-
2001 
 All Banks Std Error Big Banks 
(Assets> 
$1B) 
Std Error Small Banks 
(Assets< 
$1B) 
Std Error 
Surcharge 
 
6.73E+09** 2.80E+09 1.23E+10*** 4.67E+09 1.34E+08 1.24E+08
Number of 
ATMs 
  
2.35E+07*** 4162531 2.20E+07*** 5105081 -2.E+07*** 5964628 
Geographic 
Dispersion 
 
5.05E+09 3.57E+09 3.98E+09 4.44E+09 N/A N/A 
Transactions 
per ATM 
 
196391.1 642715.6 242745.2 1191880 -5889.235 26011.16 
Bank 
CapitalRatio 
 
-2.06E+09** 8.46E+08 -3.07E+09** 1.27E+09 -7160013 4.65E+07
Bank Assets 
 
-0.0266869 0.070348 0.001014 0.086113 -1.740657 1.165918 
 Market 
Share 
 
-2.08E+07 5.70E+07 -3623633 6.95E+07 1.90E+08** 6.34E+07
Constant 
 
2.11E+09 1.03E+10 1.75E+09 1.48E+10 1.34E+09 7.18E+08
Sample Size 
 
278  183  95  
2R  Within 
 
0.75  0.75  0.24  
2R  Between 
 
0.47  0.51  0.00  
2R  Overall 
 
0.59  0.62  0.00  
Hausman 
Test 2χ  
283.024(0.00) 
Random 
effects is 
inappropriate  
 239.30(0.000)
Random 
effects is 
inappropriate 
 18.60(0.00) 
Random 
effects is 
inappropriate 
 
***   Indicates p value of 1%   
**     Indicates p value of 5% 
*       Indicates p value of 10% 
(.)     Indicates  p value 
N/A. Because small banks were not geographically dispersed enough and there was insufficient 
variability across banks this variable was dropped in the small bank tests in this sample. 
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Table 8:  
The Relationship Between ATM Surcharge and Dollar Value of Bank Deposits (Lead), 1996-
2001 
 All Banks Std Error Big Banks 
(Assets> 
$1B) 
Std Error Small Banks 
(Assets< 
$1B) 
Std Error 
Surcharge 
 
 4.98E+09* 2.64E+09 9.06E+09** 4.45E+09 8.21E+07 7.67E+07 
Number of 
ATMs 
  
 1.09E+07*** 3933569 9676405** 4862513 -1.19E+7*** 3687363 
Geographic 
Dispersion 
 
 7.42E+09** 3.37E+09 6.64E+09 4.23E+09 N/A N/A 
Transactions 
per ATM 
 
91173.39 607362.8 65012.23 1135248 -2690.629 16080.23 
Bank 
CapitalRatio 
 
-1.65E+09** 8.00E+08 -2.50E+09** 1.21E+09 549617.1 2.88E+07 
Bank Assets 
 
 0.25841*** 0.066479 0.2808756*** 0.082022 -0.9724481 0.720777 
Market 
Share 
-3.91E+07 5.38E+07 -2.55E+07 6.62E+07 1.09E+08*** 3.92E+07 
Constant 
 
-2.18E+09 9.71E+09 -2.26E+09 1.41E+10 8.67E+08* 4.44E+08 
Sample Size 
 
278  183  95  
2R  Within 
 
0.81  0.81  0.22  
2R  Between 
 
0.72  0.75  0.00  
2R  Overall 
 
0.73  0.77  0.00  
Hausman 
Test 2χ  
  21.21(0.00)  
Random 
effects is 
inappropriate 
estimator 
 14.84 (0.03) 
Random 
effects is 
inappropriate 
estimator  
 19.09(0.00)  
Random 
effects is 
inappropriate 
estimator 
 
***   Indicates p value of 1%   
**     Indicates p value of 5% 
*       Indicates p value of 10% 
(.)     Indicates  p value 
N/A. Because small banks were not geographically dispersed enough and there was insufficient 
variability across banks this variable was dropped in the small bank tests in this sample. 
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